

EUARENAS

CITIES AS ARENAS OF POLITICAL INNOVATION IN THE STRENGTHENING OF DELIBERATIVE AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

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1. POLITICS IN DELIBERATION - CRITICISM OF THE APOLITICAL NATURE OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES

Politics in Deliberation – Criticism of The Apolitical Nature of Public Institutions and Policies

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Apoliticalness, a crucial concept for the enlightenment theories of rational politics, claims a possibility of taking a non-biased, neutral stance on matters of political or social interest. It is actualized in the democratic promise of deliberation, especially in its idealistic type that mediates individual interest through a communicative reason. The possibility of conducting politics free of coercion and thusly realized vested interests – that is to say, without the characteristics of 'the political' – is as important as the radically democratic legitimacy of the law that comes from a process of achieving a rational consensus. This plays a fundamental role at the level of ideal theories since it is only on this premise that the conflicted concepts of freedom and equality can be combined through a medium of rational and public use of language.

The mirage of the apoliticalness accompanies deliberation through its consecutive stages of development, including the more critical generations and type II conceptualizations of the deliberative ideal (Bachtiger et al., 2010; Elstub, Ercan, & Mendonça, 2016), taking on particular importance in the context of the systemic turn. The absence of coercion is to be one of the main indicators considered when evaluating the deliberative potential of the systemic solutions in question. The systemic turn refers to 'the intuition that being pressured into doing something and being persuaded into it are different. Deliberation is about genuine persuasion, not pressure. A full systemic theory of deliberation would require an elaborated defense of where to draw the line between pressure and persuasion' (Mansbridge et al., 2012, p. 18). Thus, the entanglement of deliberative practices in a system of democratic and political mechanisms of a non-deliberative nature, including the problematic issue of incorporation of the category of self-interest into the theory of deliberative democracy, takes place primarily on the assumption that deliberation is itself a form of investigation into political decisions that is free from the coercion (pressure) of power, even if that ideal is treated in a regulative manner (Mansbridge et al., 2010, p. 64-65).

Both the subject matter of this discussion and the arguments used are reminiscent of another important debate in political science, which began in the late 1980s. It is a debate on the political dimension of public policy, that is, such an activity at the meeting point between science and politics, which promises to provide objective analyses to the politicians of all options to support proper decision-making, independent of particular interests of various actors involved in the process. It is noteworthy that the theory of deliberation, regardless of its democratic aspect, also makes such a promise. In this paper, I endeavor to show some similarities between these concepts, thereby viewing deliberation as a method of decision-making in public policy. Considering the positions – and indeed, as Deborah Stone suggests, the paradoxes – of the 'argumentative turn', I focus on the tensions between the ideal of rational communication and the political characterization of the conditions under which it operates.

Paradoxes of decisionism in public policy

The orientation that pervaded public policy in post-war political science until (at least) the late 1980s is decisionism. It refers to a policy model in which the general objectives of public policies set by politicians are pursued on the basis of thorough analyses by designated experts who, in accordance with scientific principles, choose optimal solutions (Bromell, 2017, p. 89-90). This trend stems from rationalist

econometry, which treats political and social problems in an extremely pragmatic way, limiting them to factors that can be parameterized and then clearly evaluated using mathematical and logical indicators. It is therefore a system of governance that is based on an information-analysis-decision process. As critics of this approach point out, the very process of analyzing and communicating its results and then persuading those in power (both in terms of the political class and the general public) is much more complex and largely based on an argument-based discussion:

> in the system of governing through discussion, analysis – even professional – is less based on formal methods of problem solving and more on the argument process… the arguments put forward by analysts, if they are to be taken seriously in public debate forums, must be convincing. Therefore, all technical language problems, including rhetorical problems, will always concern analysts (Majone, 2004, p. 21)[1].

Public policy, in an effort to operate at the intersection of science, technology and politics, cannot therefore be a simple transfer of scientific methods to the decision-making process in a competitive political environment. Even without considering famous Foucauldian remarks about science as a contingent discourse resulting from the power/knowledge formation process, the presumably objectivistic methods of political analysis clearly alter its character: they are meant not so much to prove the validity of their thesis, but to convince and motivate certain public policy recipients (Majone, 2004, p. 97-98). Majone therefore suggests that the correctness and relevance of the analysis in public policy is of course important, but nevertheless, secondary. Firstly, because political conditions ultimately amount to action in a situation of increased uncertainty, where many indicators elude experts and, additionally, at the level of their formation, they are put to subjective evaluation. In addition, analysts themselves are 'usually inherently biased in their assessment of their proposals and more likely to be skeptical of any evidence of possible adverse effects than a less involved person' (Majone, 2004, p. 19). Secondly, and most importantly, the final political decision is made not under the influence of information, but because of the power of persuasion in formulating and giving evidence of its validity. In addition to economic rationality, it is therefore also necessary to take into account variables such as the prevailing norms and values in society/politics, the reputation of scientists and the institution their represent/graduate from, and the reliability of their choice of assumptions and methods, rhetorical skills and, finally, the complexity of the analyzed matter.

Stone also describes the specifics of the expert analysis process in public policy in a similar way. She points out that, in public policy discussions, the subject-matter of the dispute is most often not just dry facts, but their interpretations and the value attributed to them (2012, p. 381). Accordingly, a decision-based analysis, under the cloak of neutrality and objectivity, carries hidden strategies with a normative purpose: 'analysis is always a species of argument. It includes some things and exclude others, and thus has a point of view' (Stone, 2012, p. 385).

Stone's criticism of public policy in the decisionist paradigm goes even deeper. In the first words of her book, she indicates the main axis of her argument: 'politicians always have at least two goals. First is a *policy goal*... Perhaps even more important, though, is a *political goal*' (2012, p. 3). It is therefore not possible to actually separate these issues, not only at the level of the analysis of the whole decision-making system, but even at the level of the analysis and arguments itself. Here, too, both the initiation of that process, the values and norms which guide it, as well as all the factors determining its effectiveness, are determined by the universally understood conditions of political rivalry (Stone, 2012, p. 10). Attempts to identify these two types of objectives analytically or in practice lead to paradoxically specific situations, i.e. those in which fundamental values, norms, rules of conduct, etc., stand in conflict, which, acting at

[1] Due to the lack access to Giandomenico Majone's *Evidence, Argument, & Persuasion in the Policy Process*, all quotations from this book are translations from the Polish edition of this book.

different levels (e.g. moral norms against legal procedures; economic efficiency against the political expectations of the electorate), put the subject in the face of the impossibility of implementing them together[2].

To conduct a public policy analysis, Stone proposes moving from a market model to a community model that appeals to a much broader range of citizens' motives, tools, and behavior patterns in the area of *polis*. Such a broad understanding of public policy does not ultimately unravel these paradoxes, but allows them to be understood and predicted, thereby broadening the discursive field of the discipline. So, what is this polis, defined as a community and not by a market model? Stone characterizes it with the help of the following features:

1. Not individuals and institutions, but communities, together with their ideas, images, wills, and activities, become the unit of analysis of authority
2. Altruism acts as an additional source of political motivation in addition to self-interest
3. The public interest exists, but it is citizens who are fighting for ways of understanding and implementing it
4. One of the main objects of interest in *polis science* is the conflict between the private and public interests
5. Influence is always associated with persuasion, and the clear demarcation of it from coercion is always questionable
6. Cooperation acts as an additional motivating factor in the functioning of society alongside (equally important) competition
7. Broadening the analysis of public policies to include the issues of loyalty which is one of the functioning social standards
8. Directing attention to groups and organizations, not individuals, as a source of social activity.
9. The information is not, in principle, objective, but rather incomplete, interpretable, and used strategically
10. Focusing on emotive motivation rather than material one
11. Perceiving the source of change not in individual pursuit of prosperity, but in ideas, persuasion, alliances, the pursuit of power, the pursuit of the public interest, and self-well-being and well-being of others (2012, p. 34–35).

These axioms and their components are analyzed in the following chapters of Stone's book. They create a much more complex picture of decision-making in the public sphere than is apparent from the many widely used models of rational communication that have become the basis of numerous models of deliberative democracy. At this point, however, I would like to focus only on the two points raised by Stone – 5 and 9. They are most closely linked to the subject matter of the analysis in this section and point to the strategic use of persuasion in the political argumentation process as its indelible characteristic. Majone also addressed the need for persuasion, claiming that it is necessary for the recipients of the analysis, such as politicians and the public: either it is intended to enable the arguments to enter their consciousness and motivate them to act, especially in situations of insolubility of evidence (2004, p. 22 to 23), or even to act against the resistance of stereotypes and wishful thinking (2004, p. 114). Returning to Stone's model, political reasoning in strategic persuasion is presented as a process of metaphor-making and categorizing of reality (Stone, 2012, p. 12), which is also intended to serve strategic public policy objectives – ultimately it is about 'creating, changing and defending *the boundaries*' (Stone, 2012, p. 384).

[2] Both in terms of the fairness of the analysis and the ability to convince decision-makers and other stakeholders.

Thus, describing the role of persuasion, Majone and Stone criticize decisionism in a pure, analytical form, i.e., as a view that political problems can be assessed and solved in a logical and mathematical way, presenting unequivocally optimal and correct solutions. Importantly, the theory of deliberation, especially in the Habermasian tradition, also avoids such an approach to argumentation: Mansbridge's words on the separation of persuasion from coercion, referred to in the introduction to this section, echo early Habermas' claim about rational communication as an action in which only the strength of the argument determines whether it is accepted or not (Habermas, 2007). In this ideal model of deliberation, the widest possible group of citizens should be involved in the communication on political problems, thereby ensuring not objective but equivalent intersubjective legitimacy, based on logical and rational arguments.

This 'primal intuition' expressed by Mansbridge also accompanies more critical considerations in type II deliberation: Iris Marion Young, Simone Chambers and John Dryzek all attempt to distinguish between desirable and undesirable rhetoric; the systemic turn discussion, on the other hand, recognizes the deliberative nature of certain forms of negotiation (Mansbridge et al., 2010) or of majority and representative political institutions (Mansbridge, etc., 2012). However, these attempts reveal some additional, although not necessarily explicit, intuitions of deliberationists: that pure argumentation may be accompanied by other processes that support it and enable it to function, while maintaining its non-coercive nature. The problematic nature of this statement is demonstrated by the analyses carried out by Majone and Stone: the above-described criticisms indicate that rational analysis in public policy must be treated argumentatively and persuasively, which does not leave its character – even if theoretically neutral – unchanged. Stone expresses this, writing about the 'two' faces of persuasion; one associated with enlightenment and the other with indoctrination:

> Persuasion as a tool of public policy has often been viewed either as a neutral instrument of science and the market or as a dangerous weapon of totalitarian governments. The ideal types obscure the nature of influence in the polis. Shaping information is an inevitable part of communication and an integral part of strategic behavior (2012, p. 330)

Stone therefore argues that persuasion cannot be treated in isolation from its manipulative or coercive component. Any attempt to draw a sharp line between 'good' and 'bad' persuasion serves to justify an ideal model that does not fit the practice of political communication. The assumptions of deliberationists, who see deliberation as a decision-making mechanism detached from political particularisms, must therefore be questioned. The political dimension of this process not only affects the environment which initiates and is influenced by deliberative processes, but, more importantly, it is inherent in the argumentation itself.

The argumentative turn

In the early 1990s, Majone's and Stone's work left its mark on a broader discussion that took place at the intersection of the studies of public policy, political science, and philosophy of politics. The phrase 'argumentative turn' was first used in 1993 by the editors of *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning* (Fischer and Forester, 1993) and has seen numerous sequels (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Hansson and Hadorn, 2016). The starting point of the authors of the phrase is similar to that of Majone and Stone – they note the two-dimensional context of the analysis in public policy, i.e., the substantive and political dimensions of the term 'argumentation' (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 4). To this end, they draw on an extremely wide and eclectic range of theories related to such philosophers and philosophies as 'Wittgenstein, Austin, Gadamer, Habermas, Foucault, and Derrida, and (...) postmodernism, post-empiricism, post-structuralism, post-positivism, etc.' (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 1). Such a wide theoretical field, which formulates this trend in the theory of politics, does not mean that it is internally

inconsistent at its most basic level. In fact, it benefits, first of all, from carefully selected elements of the abovementioned trends, which provide tools for critical analysis of specific political practices, separating them, at least in part, from their idealistic assumptions. However, that eclecticism also does not mean that certain contradictory tendencies are avoided in this trend, in which, as I note in the next section, different explanations and interpretations of the various phenomena involved in political argumentation and analysis are used, especially when the deliberative approach is employed in the discussion.

In terms of the subject matter, the argumentative turn focuses on the work and operation of analysts and political advisors. Their specific position between expertise and policy requires not only providing solutions to the problems raised, but also constitutes the multidimensional character of their work. When analyzing the political environment, they *de facto* carry out the following tasks: locating facts and creation of data collection mechanisms; constructing values; ensuring professional and personal relations with colleagues (with their political principals and with the stakeholders who are the subjects of the decision); anticipating the consequences of the proposed solutions in practical, political and ethical terms (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 2). In addition, such a wide range of functions performed by an analyst is considered under complex conditions that significantly affect the implementation of these practices. Public policy analysis is formulated in the context of: the development of network societies and related new styles of public governance (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003); application of methods for anticipating, planning and evaluating actions undertaken in conditions of uncertainty (Hansson and Hadorn, 2016); analysis of public policy through discursive frames (Hawkesworth, 2012; Rein and Schön, 1993); the ambiguous role of rhetoric and narrative in public policy (Gottweis, 2012; Kaplan, 1993), as well as many other technical and methodological problems. In some cases, the emphasis on the democracy of the decision-making process also plays an important interpretative role.

Given such a vast range of theoretical inspirations, subjects of interest and methodological approaches, the argumentative turn can be described as a platform for presentation and exchange of thoughts that seek to characterize the analysis of public policies in the perspective of analytical criticism and positive rationality. This also emphasizes the nature of the basic works that shape this turn – they are multi-author monographs, collecting essays set in diverse theoretical contexts. One of the themes, is the overstepping of cognitive relativism, which in the analysis of public policy cannot, according to the basic assumptions of the argumentative turn, be based on direct correspondence between neutral language and facts (evidence-based policy making), thereby providing an objective description of the world. The way to break this impasse is to turn towards practice (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, p. 14). In this approach, I am interested in the two-pronged character of argumentative turn, since in the search for the legitimacy of analyses in public policy, the authors usually refer to one of two approaches: interpretative or deliberative one.

The interpretive approach, relating to the hermeneutic tradition in the epistemology and philosophy of language, presupposes the impossibility of referring to the extralinguistic aspects of social life to resolve the argumentative contradictions that arise in discussions on public issues. This manifests itself both at the level of diagnoses and proposed methods of analysis and evaluation. This is clearly represented in the discussion on the aforementioned **discursive frames**: Martin Rein and Donald Schön describe them in the context of political controversies that occur at all levels of their activity: in everyday language, in the language of science and in the language of public policy; and concern all aspects of it i.e., facts, values, theories and interests (1993, p. 146). The social world described by them is constructed by several discursive frames, which often compete with each other to impose a certain understanding of specific issues. In these circumstances, the problem of relativism cannot be definitively solved, but their proposed method of reflecting on these frames (***frame-reflective discourse***) can alleviate the conflicting attitude between different discursive frames. The discourse, reflecting on its own frame, has the best chance of initiating a process of transformation of the views and claims of groups or individuals, allowing the

discussion to be transferred to the 'meta' level, indicating, and describing those arguments in discussions which are contradictory due to different points of reference (Rein and Schön, 1993, p. 159–162). Martin Hajer describes this in the same volume, referring to the slightly broader concept of **'discursive coalitions'**. It calls for an analysis of public policy by interpreting the process of formation, transformation, and the inquiry into the dominance of particular discursive coalitions as links between specific narratives, discursive frames, values, justifications in close association with the actors leading these narratives and their corresponding practices (1993, p. 46–47). Their dominance is manifested by acceptance (whether through persuasion or coercion) and, subsequently, institutionalization, that is to say, by the influence of a particular discursive coalition on specific political solutions (Hajer, 1993, p. 66). The post-structural **deconstruction** of the discursive frames in the process of public argumentation can also serve as a tool to support the understanding of limitations, exclusions, and relationships of power at the intersection of classes, gender, nationality, etc. (Hawkesworth, 2012).

Another area where the interpretive approach appears to be effective is the analysis of narratives and rhetoric. According to Thomas Kaplan, the hermeneutic approach indicates that the adoption or rejection of a given decision in the process of argumentation in public policies is determined by an appropriate narrative and not by a complete statement of 'dry' facts. The recipient of the communication or expert opinion is more inclined to decide under the influence of a coherent narrative, containing the beginning, middle and end and consistently binding basic elements (agent, action, scene, performance, and purpose, that is, answering the main questions: **Who? What? Where? How? For what purpose?**). Thus, a specific test of the epistemological value of a narrative is precise checking of its completeness and coherence by following the patterns of **hermeneutic literary analysis** (Kaplan, 1993, p. 172–178). John Forester, on the other hand, claims that, in the context of the analysis and planning of public policies, the analysis of a **practical narrative**, based simply on listening to the stories of specific stakeholders, is an important tool for the analyst in a comprehensive and fluid, ambiguous public situation (1993, p. 192). The author does not seek legitimacy based on measurable evaluation of specific stories – he pays attention rather to the ethics of friendship, which is based on empathy and attention which build a relationship of reciprocity. In the context of political analysis, this ethics means that instead of a rational analysis of the facts, the counsellor should learn from the people with whom he works as he learns things about his friends by listening to their stories (Forester, 1993, p. 197).

Authors employing the interpretative perspective in their works sometimes directly oppose the assumptions of the theory of deliberation. Herbert Gottweis refers to rhetoric in a similar way to Majone and Stone, pointing to its pervasiveness in the argument process and, therefore, to the impossibility of avoiding persuasion in the communication process (2012). He thus criticizes the deliberative approach, demonstrating that the argumentation process resembles free competition between different persuasive forms rather than a rational logic of considering facts and arguments. The interpretive approach – both at the theoretical and methodological level – is also the main subject of the entire volume of *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis. Reasoning about Uncertainty* (Hansson and Hadorn, 2016) , in which the researchers focus on the analysis of public policy in a climate of radical, perpetual uncertainty about the ambiguity of facts, arguments, values, the consequences of decisions taken, etc.

Deliberative policy analysis in the argumentative turn

The argumentative turn, from its appearance in the late 1980s till now, intersects with the parallel theory of deliberation, although it has never really become an immanent part of it or even a popular inspiration for it. It has, rather, autonomously developed its own formula for writing about deliberation, namely the concept

of deliberative political analysis. In fact, the relationships between the theory of deliberation and the argumentative turn when traced back to the bibliography appear rather scarce. Dryzek, who is one of the main representatives of the deliberative mainstream in the theory of democracy, is the author of a chapter in the most important works that make up the argumentative turn (Fischer and Forester, 1993) and, co-authored with Carolyne Hendriks, (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012). However, in his most important publications on deliberation, he does not invoke the argumentative turn. It cannot be found in other mainstream deliberation theorists, even the ones most critical of the argumentative process, such as Young and Mansbridge. Deliberative democrats, even if they refer to the argumentative turn, they rather point to the common Habermasian sources of these trends (Floridia, 2018). It is worth noting, however, that the article on deliberative political analysis was included in The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy (Fischer and Boossabong, 2018), although in this volume there are also no argumentative turn influenced discussions with the foundations of the theory of deliberative democracy.

How does, then, the deliberative approach manifest itself in the argumentative turn? Firstly, deliberation is presented as an alternative perspective, alongside an interpretative one designed to provide tools to avoid the problem of relativism. Following Habermas' arguments, this is done on an epistemological groundwork. In the face of a shift away from positivism in the analysis of public policies, authors such as Dryzek and Bruce Jennings advocate radicalization of the democratic process by applying standards of legitimacy appealing to consensus (Jennings, 1993) or to discursive ethics (Dryzek, 1993). In this case, the constraints that shape the operating conditions of public policy experts and analysts are to be relaxed by recourse to open, public discussion. Habermas' deliberative inspirations are also visible at the level of practical analysis. Duncan McRae points to two possibilities facing the analyst: a consensual situation, that is, a deliberative discussion between participants with a relative similarity of positions, and an adversarial situation in which the participants of the discussion are opponents of each other, and the situation itself can be described as a zero-sum game (1993). This division corresponds to a distinction between communication and strategic activities proposed by Habermas. Patsy Healey similarly reflects on the communication of rationality as a means of social polarization – the pursuit of agreement in the consideration of differences and tensions can then take place because of mutual respect and increasing understanding (1993). These reflections are also continued in her later works, where, referring to universal pragmatism, she describes new deliberative practices in the context of applying them to public policies (Healey, De Magalhaes, Madanipour, and Pendlebury, 2003; Healey, 2012).

From this analysis of the content of the key texts which constitute the argumentative turn, the above-mentioned ambiguity emerges in regard to the theoretical frameworks adopted by the various authors. On the one hand, the editors of the first volume of this strand indicate in its introduction that the argumentative turn ‘concerned with the contingencies of democratic deliberation. Planning and policy arguments cannot be presumed to be optimally clear, true, cogent, and free from institutional biases. Democratic deliberation is always precarious and always vulnerable, if inevitably argumentative as well’ (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 7). On the other hand, there have been numerous attempts to use the deliberative approach as a suggested solution to the problems raised in the context of the argumentative turn (as mentioned above by Dryzek and Jennings), and in later years there have been attempts to unite the two perspectives – the interpretative and the deliberative one (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, p. 13). However, these attempts seem problematic, and some elements of both perspectives are mutually exclusive: the theory of deliberation, in the formula in which it is presented in the context of the argumentative turn, does not provide a satisfactory response to the hermeneutic remarks that accompany this strand since the texts of Majone and Stone. To illustrate this relationship, it is worth looking at one of the essays, which was included in a book edited by Fischer and Gottweis, and which considers the relationship between deliberation and the argumentative turn.

Dryzek and Hendriks combine the argumentative turn with two transformations within the theory of deliberative democracy. Firstly, they point out that the argumentative turn in the theory of deliberation is visible in extending the scope of acceptable or even desirable forms of communication in deliberation. The second element of the argumentative turn, which coincides with changes in the paradigm of deliberative theory, is the movement towards institutionalizing the process of deliberation into concrete practices (2012, p. 31). However, it is impossible to indicate specific, bibliographically documented cases in which the texts associated with the argumentative turn directly shaped this tendency in the theory of deliberation, which Dryzek and Hendriks write about. There is a parallel development here rather than convergence.

Moreover, the same authors view the argumentative turn mainly through the lens of its criticism of purely rational argumentation, implying its partial link with 'the political' (the discursive and symbolic involvement of the argument process) and politics (that is, the institutional conditions which the process must fit in with). In the same volume, they describe their 'broad view' of what deliberative communication is: 'We thus admit any kinds of communications as long as they can induce reflection on the part of those who attend to the communication, are noncoercive, can connect particular interests to some more general principles, and involve an effort to communicate in terms that others can accept' (Dryzek and Hendriks, 2012, p. 33). Of the four above mentioned boundary conditions of what determines the deliberativeness of public policy for these authors, one of the elements in particular points to a significant difference between the core of the argumentative turn and the theory of deliberation – it is the condition of noncoercive communication. This condition must be adopted in the theory of deliberation, because only according to this principle can a radically democratic transformation of the will of the individual into a collective, rational public will take place. However, being consistent in referring to Majone's arguments, and Stone's in particular, such arguments cannot be accepted – any political argument, not just one in which experts and professional analysts take part, operates on the basis of rhetoric, narratives or discursive frames that will always at least to some extent impose and favor certain points of view.

To sum up the importance of the discussion on the question of argumentative turn in the context of deliberation, I would like to draw attention to two issues which are important for the genealogical reconstruction of the theory of deliberative democracy. Firstly, there is a significant similarity between the two theories in terms of numerous arguments, not only at the level of criticism of meritocratic decisionism, but to some extent also in terms of proposed solutions. Secondly, despite these similarities, differences in theoretical approaches are clearly highlighted in the argumentative turn. Especially in the context of analyzing problems such as uncertainty conditions, functioning of the discursive frames, the role of narratives or rhetoric, it is the interpretative approach that appears to be a more useful source of theory and methods, at least in part mitigating problems related to the planning and analysis of public policies. To draw further genealogical conclusions from this observation, the following question must be asked above all: Why did the argumentative turn have such little effect on the theory of deliberation?

On the one hand, this can be explained by the difference in subject of interest between the two theories: the argumentative turn focuses primarily on the professional activity of analysts and experts who are involved in the political decision-making process; the theory of deliberative democracy, on the other hand, refers only to the process of shaping the democratic will and opinion of ordinary citizens, who, on the one hand, rely on professional expert analysis but, on the other hand, are to balance its negative impact and to transcend other limitations. The role of professional analysts is therefore much wider, since it is not limited to participation in certain deliberative practices, but it is continuous and involves close cooperation with the authorities and other stakeholders at different stages of the decision-making process. However, recalling the premise of the argumentative turn that primarily opposed the rationalist and apolitical notion of this section of the decision-making process, which provides analysis and an optimal solution to the problem, the subject matters of the two theories seem to be much closer to each other. In the theory of

deliberative democracy, particularly in the context of systemic turn, citizens perform similar functions as experts in decisionist theories – their role is not only that of internal reflection, but also the promotion of their own arguments, the persuading of decision-makers and other centers of public opinion, as well as the alleviation of conflicts, the formation of civic attitudes and virtues, etc. Despite the specific and significant differences, resorting to the universal legitimacy of ordinary citizens is intended, on the one hand, to balance the potential bias of experts (who constantly play an important role in theory and practice of deliberation) and, on the other hand, to ensure that these decisions are not only substantive, but also have democratic legitimacy. However, the decision-making process based on arguments continues to encounter the same problems, and the specifics of the work of the analyst and public policy planner are similar to the functioning of deliberative practices manifest through the lens of systemic turn.

The second explanation implied by the argumentative turn analysis is the theoretical incompatibility as described above. While some authors cite Habermas, there are many other approaches, including Wittgenstein's or Gadamer's hermeneutics, eventually rejected by the author of *The Theory of Communicative Act*. Numerous references to Stone and Majone, as well as analysis of the content of individual essays, indicate the important – and fruitful – role of the interpretive approach. Hermeneutics, however, has been treated with considerable constraint since the beginning of the theory of deliberative democracy, as it increases – compared to discursive ethics – the threat of relativism. It can therefore be concluded that, at the level of the basic theoretical concept, the argumentative turn does not, in principle, fit either ideal type I or type II deliberations. The mechanism for building legitimacy through the transfer of rationality from the individual level to the public and intersubjective one does not exist here. The argumentative turn points to the need to reject the premise of neutral rationality – including that of communication – and, in principle, exposes the manipulative nature of social communication. This can only be countered by the suggested deepening of critical reflection on the sources of these differences, possibly some narrative suggestions that may support the work of officials or the activity of citizens in the process of deliberation, thereby critically improving (but not necessarily democratizing or rationalizing!) the political decision-making process. This seems to be a much more important reason for the theorists' failure to analyze the argumentative turn of deliberative democracy than the earlier suggestion that it develops within public policies rather than within the theory of democracy.

Deliberation without foundation – breaking with the apolitical approach

Criticism of the limits of rationality, the contingency of knowledge formation and its correlation with power, the theory of hegemony-based discourse, and the rejection of an apolitical model of expertise and professional analysis of public policies reveal the shortcomings of criticism of the ideal type of deliberation by authors classified as type II deliberationists. The analysis of the same arguments on a post-foundationalist basis indicates a lack of coherence between the noticing and the proposed solution to the theoretical and practical problems associated with the ideal type of deliberation, both in terms of consensus as its purpose and rational communication as its tool. In both cases, the solutions suggested in the context of the Type II deliberation theory are *ad hoc* in nature and consist in patching up the gaps thus created, while preserving the privileged role of reason, and consensus as its product. This is why they are unable to fully realize either the epistemic or, following in the footsteps of radical democratic theories, the agonistic potential contained in deliberation.

The selected aspects of post-foundationalist criticism presented in this paper, when juxtaposed with the theory of deliberation show how, starting from similar assumptions (criticism of positivism, individualism, capitalism, etc.; focusing on practice as the source of ideological order; the belief in the emancipation role

of social philosophy), the trend of deliberation eventually weakened in its critical consistence, *de facto* incorporating some of the originally rejected assumptions. The mechanisms of this process have been prevalent in three fundamental theoretical categories of deliberative democracy: language, reason and the individual. Referring to them, I would like to outline the fundamental issues which are indicated by the criticism of deliberation presented in this essay.

The discussion on the issue of language focuses on two points: its fundamental way of working and its capability to be autonomous. In the first point, the objective is to determine what the basic function of language is: is it, as Habermas suggests, a function of illocution, that is, the pursuit of agreement, or is it a function of dividing the discursive world? Habermas, in his assumptions, infers not only the possibility of consensus but even its original (and not parasitic) nature; for Rawls, such consensus is possible under properly processed conditions. On the other hand, post-structuralists refer to language as functional only through separating, hiding, and negation. This approach results in a social ontology built on an immanent conflict, which can be suppressed – but never fully eliminated – by some sort of consensus.

There is a fundamental difference, though, which is manifested at the level of the evaluation of that consensus in the context of the autonomy of language: Habermas, starting from his own assumptions, refers to language – and more specifically to communication as an autonomous tool for achieving consensus, to some extent independent of the political system of forces, personal interests, and hidden psychological influences. In a post-foundationalist context, in turn, consensus is presented as a tool of an ultimate discursive domination and exclusion – and language is the field where these discourses are shaped and legitimized. Thus, language, including the rational language of facts and logic is not so much autonomous regarding power, as is itself the basis for it.

Such understanding of language has a significant effect on the understanding of rationality and reason. Whereas for Rawls and Habermas individual rationality is susceptible to cognitive or logical errors, it obtains universal legitimacy in the process of public reflection, since in this way these errors can be eliminated. A democratic, rational debate, which submits all the arguments to in-depth reflection based on facts and expert analysis, is intended to take into consideration all points of view and reservations until they find a justification that can be accepted by everyone. Deliberation type II notes that such a 'dry' debate is either impractical or even dangerous – which is why the authors of successive generations of deliberative democracy theory seek to broaden the means of communication, but also the role of expertise, to balance such specific shortcomings, while maintaining the essentially rational nature of deliberation. From a post-foundationalist perspective, however, such treatments are doomed to failure.

Firstly, the role of experts itself is much more problematic – they are not only subject to individual shortcomings in their practice, but they find themselves in a systemic knowledge/power relationship, being both a product and a producer of certain standards and practices, far exceeding the perspective of individual experts or even specific disciplines. Therefore, expert knowledge – although undoubtedly necessary in the deliberative decision-making process – cannot be deliberatively 'verified' or 'balanced', as it is at the most general level a key element of the same discursive complex in which the other participants in deliberation are situated.

Secondly, the problem for deliberation is the impossibility of providing information in an objective, neutral and non-persuasive manner. Attempts to classify non-rational means of communication as desirable and undesirable (in particular, in relation to rhetoric, emotions, or negotiations) become problematic in the context of the very theory of type II deliberation. The post-foundationalist perspective in general questions the reasonableness of such a categorical separation of rational arguments from rhetoric, passion, narrative, etc. with regard to effective communication practice. From this perspective, it therefore seems impossible

to build a social theory based solely on the power of argument and democratic legitimacy by consensus, since behind any rational argument there are persuasive mechanisms, a contingent context of discourse and unjustified universalization, as well as a network of confessed or hidden interests and institutional or political links.

A significant difference between the deliberative and post-foundationalist approaches also arises regarding the concept of the individual. The basic aspect of the citizen in deliberation is the assumption of his dialogicality and rationality. Moreover, the theory of deliberation, particularly in its idealistic formulation, requires for its proper functioning citizens who are characterized by total freedom of communication, i.e., of formulating and criticizing judgements. This should be guaranteed not only by formal institutions and rights, but also by informal communication. The post-foundationalist perspective assumes the dialogicality of individuals – it is through language and communication that people give meaning to the material and social world, thus creating and changing it. Man, however, is not free in the formulation of these judgments – he is limited not only by cultural norms, values, and views, which are connected with the rationalizing social and political context in which his socialization takes place, but above all, and to a much greater extent than the theory of deliberation implies, he is shaped by the basic grammatical, logical, and semantic rules of the very linguistic environment in which he functions. These rules set the original horizon of how and what can be talked about and what remains beyond words, unable to exist in the public consciousness due to the lack of adequate means of expression.

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the critique set out above calls into question all the elements of the mechanism that are crucial for the theory of deliberative democracy: the treatment of language as a medium that is responsible for transferring rational arguments from the individual to the level of public reason, thereby guaranteeing the radical democratic character of this process. The various elements of this mechanism appear in the context of criticism to be either naively simplistic or based on unfounded assumptions about individuality, language, or rationality. However, this does not mean that deliberation does not work or has no effect – on the contrary, the popularity of this theory translates into an increasing use of it in political practice. Studies carried out on both experimental and authentic deliberative practices indicate effects specific to it, but not necessarily based on consensus and involving radically democratic legitimacy of decisions. Deliberative mechanisms, proved effective in dealing with issues such as the inclusion of residents in the spatial planning process and transport policy, the settlement of conflicts and reduction of social tensions, or the increase in support for representatively elected authorities. To be able to better understand, describe and plan the deliberative mechanisms, it is necessary to consider whether they can be described on the basis of ontological and epistemological concepts not referring to foundations associated with analytical and enlightenment tradition. Such a proposition opens up if we consequentially follow the other branch of the argumentative turn, i.e. the interpretative, hermeneutic approach to policy-making process.

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2. PANDEMIC CHALLENGES AND THE MODELS OF DEMOCRACY

Pandemic Challenges and the Models of Democracy

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1. Pandemic and Politics

For more than a year now the world has struggled with the rising tide of infections caused by SARS-Cov2. The scale of the problem is best illustrated by numbers: on the 25th of November 2020, the cumulative count of 62 153 458 of confirmed cases was registered with death toll of 1 443 300, and on that day, there were 486 545 of confirmed cases and 6907 deaths[1]. At the same time, however, it is stressed that not all countries have been equally severely affected by the pandemic. According to data provided by John Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Centre the highest death toll has been registered in the US, Brazil, India, Mexico, and the UK[2].

These shocking statistics reveal the scale of the problem indicate that the pandemic is not only the matter of purely technical actions of the healthcare system and medical services, although, admittedly, it is now extremely important to assess their operation, but above all, it is a social, political, and cultural phenomenon which, evidently, can have far-reaching effects on societies. The great Black Death epidemic that decimated the population of Europe in the 14th century affected the economy of that period, and indirectly, its politics. Historical data show that, although during the plague the social inequalities in terms of income decreased, the situation swiftly came back to the norm and even increased them[3]. Evidently, the plague, enhanced and accelerated pre-existing tendencies rather than created new social or political mechanisms. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, shows specific traits whose political impact should be analyzed before we can assess its far-reaching consequences.

The pandemic exposes both weaknesses and strengths of science. In this respect, it is “scientifically” constructed. Without access to pandemic stats and mathematical propagation equations, it could have been easily overlooked or taken for a new strand of flu. Nevertheless, the influence of these indicators can be deemed ambivalent. Warnings were often ignored or lost in the information overload, as they referred to previous epidemics which, despite initial concerns, were limited in scope. This led to the underestimation of the threat at the onset of the virus before scientific research provided adequate data and, first of all, proper extrapolations which forced governments to take up suitable actions. The power of science was sufficient to construct the pandemic, but insufficient to contain it. Sophisticated methods of science, such as: genetic tests, biochemical analyses on the one hand, and elaborate techniques of mathematical modelling on the other, are harnessed to implement the most basic and time-tested methods, such as quarantine and isolation. Obviously, these ancient measures are complemented with state-of-the-art methods of social modelling, but they have been unaltered at their core and their application is basically intuitive as is shown by the differences in scope and strictness of the implemented measures among particular countries. We are thus presented with a paradox here. In many cases, the effects of the pandemic are not clearly visible in” the world of everyday experience” (Lebenswelt); they appear as dry numbers of new cases in media reports. Simultaneously, epidemiologic data and modelling methods based on elaborate statistics show that we are confronted with a lethal threat.

[1] Dane z JHU CSSE Covid-19 at 09.25, 30 Nov 2020

[2] Ibid. (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu, access: 30.11.2020)

[3] Scheidel, W. (2018) The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century, Princeton University Press

This specific nature of the pandemic obviously affects its reception in everyday life due to the fact that its visibility is limited, or, so to speak, secondary. What most of us can see are empty streets and precautionary measures such as face masks, disinfectants, protective gloves, social distancing etc. We see much more through the media: the pandemic is probably the first health crisis that is so widely, globally broadcast and discussed in real time. The discordancy between a direct perception of the pandemic and the necessary- as scientists and governments insist- restrictions changing everyday life brings about a constant tension which has not yet been alleviated in any pandemic-stricken countries. Due to this discrepancy, a cognitive gap is created through which all sorts of phantasies squeeze in, starting from conspiracy theories, through dusted-off religious preaching of penalty for sins and related millenarism, to visions of the new world emerging after the pandemic has been eradicated.

2. The Pandemic and the controversies of democratic society

The specific nature of current pandemic and the entirety of experience gained while responding to this crisis may significantly change the form of democratic societies. It is noteworthy that the pandemic has set off certain contradictory tendencies and, at present, it is difficult to predict the drift of events. Moreover, similarly to the previous great plagues, the COVID-19 pandemic is a sort of an amplifier of preexisting social and political trends. It can be assumed that some trends will be enhanced while others will be rejected or reduced. Let me point to some of the major areas in which such trends may occur or have already occurred.

1. Globality-Locality: toward cooperation and integration or autonomy?

    a. Pandemic is a global phenomenon and thus it should be dealt with globally. It is reflected at numerous levels. Chinese scientists by making the virus genome accessible helped accelerate timelines for development and rolling out new vaccines. Sharing information on the virus altered the trajectories of scientific publications and helped create platforms for instant, cost-free sharing of findings. International cooperation is essential for development, allocation, and deployment of new vaccines. Similarly, close cooperation is required to alleviate the economic losses caused by the pandemic. A clear example is the EU's initiative to set up a fund for the compensation of economic losses incurred due to the pandemic.

    b. At the same time, as is generally known, the governments of Poland and Hungary highlight the sovereignty and autonomy of the national state. Although their attitude is evidently related to certain internal policy issues, nevertheless it signifies a deeper problem. The pandemic, while enforcing cooperation, at the same time strengthens the sentiments for an autonomous national state. The pandemic response has never been agreed upon by the states, on the contrary, each country implemented their own strategy. Obviously, these strategies showed some common elements, but they were the result of common conditions rather than the consequence of intentional cooperation. Moreover, the national strategies of pandemic response seem to reflect the political system and culture of a given country rather than general pandemic factors. A comparison between China and Sweden provide a clear illustration of this characteristic. The former resorted to radical control of citizen's behavior while the latter implemented appeals and democratic debates on applied restrictions. The separatist trends in national states may also be reinforced by so called 'vaccine nationalism" i.e., the efforts of particular countries to acquire and distribute the vaccines as quickly as possible. This attitude seems understandable as the effectiveness shown in such an important area can, to a large extent, translate into favorable results in the post-pandemic-elections. This strategy is not only instrumental in character; the national divisions into "us' and 'them' still play a key role as the governments try to fight for their "own" citizens. Such attitude, however, leads to enhanced

entrenchment in nationalist positions.

c. **Conclusion**: In this case the pandemic enhances the preexisting controversy between tendencies to form supranational institutions and organizations and to return to the well-known forms and institutions of national state. It should be assumed that the COVID-19 epidemic favors the latter trend, at least in the sense that the state is more trusted than distant, transnational forms of power. This is due to the fact that, according to the laws of social psychology and sociology, in crisis situations there is a tendency to close in well-known cognitive structures. There is also a tendency to simplify the situation to find quick solutions So, it seems that at least in the near future the democratic forces will come under pressure from supporters of a return to the greatest possible powers of the national state and extreme isolationism. It is a dangerous trend because even the eradication of this pandemic will not safeguard us against its new strain which may threaten the world. According to many scholars, our ways of producing food, but also social habits will promote the propagation and spread of new strains of the virus. Such a new strain has already appeared in the UK during the holiday week. Fortunately, it seems that newly developed vaccines will also be effective in this case, but worse case scenarios cannot be ruled out in the future. Moreover, other global challenges, such as climate issues, which require the cooperation of many countries, have not disappeared.

2. Democracy of expertise or democracy of sovereignty: the media and “fake news”

a. The pandemic is an extremely complex phenomenon whose understanding, as I wrote above, requires considerable scientific knowledge as well as knowledge how to combat it. Pandemic decisions are made by politicians on the base of expertise of scholars or, strictly speaking, are often a compromise between policy requirements and science-based guidelines. For example, when epidemiologists recommend a strict closure and politicians choose a softer variant for the sake of economy or to adjust it to citizens’ habits. Despite such compromises, the authority of experts has become significant. Scientists often endorse decisions and take responsibility for them. Thus, the pandemic enhances tendencies whose origins can be traced back to the beginnings of liberal democracy and which have been on the increase since the beginning of the XIX century - leaving key decisions in the hands of experts. It is not surprising as modern societies are complex organisms whose functioning depends on the cooperation of many elements. To be able to see these interdependences requires knowledge which is, obviously, not equally accessible to everyone, hence the role of experts. However, this knowledge has been contested and questioned as often as it was used. A great debate on the role of experts swept through all the countries affected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis when economy professionals took up the reins of power and dictated the measures for alleviating the crisis. An additional issue is the erosion of trust in science caused by the fact that expert opinions are often deemed contradictory and inconclusive, which leads to all kinds of disinformation taking the form of “fake news”, especially widespread in social media. Therefore, even if we were to assume, following the early 20th century classic of media science Walter Lippman, that expert authority is a necessity, its rationality would still be threatened by the information overload in social media. Unfortunately, the pandemic has enhanced a tendency to undermine the role of scientific experts, even though the polls show that 61% of Poles still trusts scientists and healthcare system the most, only 21% trusts the government and 26% trusts the media[4]. The pandemic has become a testing ground for spreading chaos and information hype into social media[5].

[4] M. Wróblewski, A. Meler, Ł. Afeltowicz, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/34R6682800_Risk, Confidence, _Infectious diseases, Poles on pandemic (access 12.12.2020)

[5] Anwar A, Malik M, Raees V, et al. (September 14, 2020) Role of Mass Media and Public Health Communications in the COVID-19 Pandemic. Cure us 12(9): e10453. doi:10.7759/cureus.10453

b. The opposite of expert democracy is popular sovereignty democracy where the voice of majority is decisive in all matters. This concept is generally referred to by populist movements whose ideologists claim that most decisions are made by experts or court verdicts based, after all, on expert opinions. Resisting such a state of affairs is, according to many experts, one of the mechanisms which fuel populism. It coincides with the difficulty experienced by the growing number of people, to understand complex rules and procedures governing modern, democratic society. As noted by a prominent political psychologist, Shawn Rosenberg, liberal democracy has fallen victim to its own success. People's cognitive powers are not developed enough to cope with the complexity of democratic politics[6]. If his diagnosis is correct, the challenges facing democracy are not incidental, but they lie at the core of its functioning. Undoubtedly, if we adopt this perspective, the pandemic may be instrumental in the failure of liberal democracy system. The reason is obvious, further restrictions and regulations, in many cases incomprehensible to most people, increase the complexity of the system. The justifications for implementing new rules are convoluted and the procedures themselves are often ambiguous. Therefore, it is not surprising, that in many countries, there are trends which oppose such conjuncture. They are generally politically marginal, but it seems reasonable to presume that they will leave their mark in people's mentality, evoke mistrust in democracy and shift public sentiment toward populism. Additional effect may be a growing distrust in science which manifests in the COVID-19 vaccination resistance.

c. **Conclusion**: The pandemic, even when it is over, will make its mark in democratic societies. It may significantly reduce trust in science, and, consequently, reduce the level of rationality in political debates and decisions. Obviously, politics is never fully rational, but a "healthy" democratic policy requires certain balance between scientific approach to social issues, and emotions. The pandemic has undermined this balance and, as a consequence the increase of populist sentiment may take place. It can be reduced, to some extent, by a rapid economic recovery, but it seems unlikely that simply improving the economy will be sufficient. There is a need to restore trust in science which must, however, be achieved by incorporating scientific data into social discourse. This strategy is necessary, not only in post-pandemic situation but also because of other global challenges facing humanity. If we fail to persuade the general public to the rational response to such an immediate threat as the pandemic, it will be even more difficult to convince them of proper action in response to climate change which also requires the change of deep-rooted habits and the reduction of consumption. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the implementation of policy that would allow for an open debate on the expert-proposed solutions. However, this, in turn, requires clearing the forefront of incorrect information and fake news. The EU-adopted directive of the 3rd of December 2020 "On the European democracy action plan"[7] gives clear guidelines on how to proceed in case of disinformation generated by both domestic organizations which contest the state policy, such as anti-vaccine movement and by foreign powers which are interested in weakening the democratic states in the EU. Implementation of the directive is a necessary step in the process of incorporation of science into democratic discourse.

[6] Shawn W. Rosenberg, The Rise of the Incompetent Citizen, and the Appeal of Right-Wing Populism w: Psychology of Political and Everyday Extremisms. Domenico Uhng Hur & José Manuel Sabucedo (Eds.)

[7] "On the European democracy action plan" Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2250).

3. The pandemic and the models of democratic societies: parliamentary democracy, deliberative democracy, hegemonic model of democracy, populism, and non-consensual democracy

The consequences of the pandemic have a significant influence on the present-day debate on democracy. This impact can be considered in two aspects:

Firstly, the lessons learned from the pandemic make it possible to predict the paths of development of different models of a democratic society, at least in the sense that we now know that certain opportunities have been blocked for a long time. As I wrote above, after the end of the Black Death in the 14th century, the inequalities that had been eliminated for a moment returned with renewed strength.

In any case, the prevalence of communal thinking can be expected in near future. The plague has brought a significant change in this respect, namely, in the dispute between communitarians and liberals, it has tipped the balance in favor of the first option. During the pandemic people seek to identify with a group, a community, and the obvious choice for such identification is the nation and/or the religion. This identification may be superficial to a large extent, since a community which is thus created is, first of all, the community of suffering, but political ideologies translate it into accessible, easily articulated values, such as the nation or the particular religion.

A community involvement also entails a particular paradox. The sense of belonging to a community is combined with behaviors of individualistic character. People in isolation are alienated individuals who are, in a way, connected by restrictions imposed by law. Therefore, it can be said that they are a paradigmatic example of the most fundamentalist liberal theory. However, the situation is at least partially broken by the use of new media, especially, social media. All in all, it can be said that the mechanism driving communal thinking is fear, both of the pandemic, and of its economic and social consequences. The vast majority of people in the closure-affected countries realize that only joint effort can mitigate the impact of the pandemic.

On a political level, the intensified sense of belonging to communities can manifest in a number of ways, which fall under various parts of the political spectrum. On an economic level, it is certain that a massive state intervention in the economy will be unavoidable. It seems that extremely popular, neoliberal, economic recipes have lost their power. David Harvey points out that the pandemic even forces capitalist economy to adopt more pro-social solutions.

It applies specifically to the sphere of distribution and redistribution of goods[8]. At present, it is difficult to imagine a radical free-market capitalism with minimal state intervention. The pandemic can therefore have similar effects to those which WWII had on the European economy when the war experience gave rise to the welfare state. It was founded on a public consensus to alleviate the inequalities through transfers from the wealthy to the lower earners[9]. Undoubtedly, evident neglect in the public sectors, especially in healthcare which came to light during the pandemic, will have to be more than compensated. Biopolitics will combine with social policy. Public healthcare has to be connected with actions aiming at equalizing opportunities and alleviating inequalities. The consequence of the pandemic should therefore be favoring solidarity solutions, at least in terms of economy. Nevertheless, this is only the first step in the analysis of the effect of the pandemic on democratic models. Each of the models below is, at its core, a certain

[8] Harvey, D. (2020) Anti-Capitalist Politics in the Time of COVID-19 in: https://jacobinmag.com/2020/03/david-harvey-coronavirus-political-economy-disruptions (access 16.12.2020)

[9] Piketty, T. Capital in the Twenty First Century, Translated by Arthur Goldhammer, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2014

spectrum of possible political solutions, and as such, has to be analyzed separately. Moreover, solidarity/social solutions in economy can involve entirely different political strategies, ranging from authoritarianism to dialogue.

Secondly, an important aspect is the internal analysis of various models of democratic society. For the sake of analysis, I chose the following options: (1) representative parliamentary democracy (classic liberal model of democracy), (2) populism, (3) deliberative democracy, (4) hegemonic model of democracy, (5) non-consensual democracy, whose outline I presented in my book[10].

1. The representative parliamentary democracy (classic democracy model) has been in permanent crisis for many years now, which has been repeatedly diagnosed and described[11]. The fundamental problem in this model is its hybrid character; it is a combination of two separate projects: inalienable individual rights (human rights) and majority rule. Both parts were consonant with each other for nearly 200 years, though obviously not without some friction. But in the last two decades there has been a distinct imbalance between them. The common point is that key decisions affecting people's lives are made by courts or experts and implemented through complicated and incomprehensible procedures. In public perception the most important issues and decisions that affect people's lives, are made behind people's backs although they should be the subjects of democracy. The course of pandemic so far indicates that the situation of liberal democracy has declined. Although, according to the Freedom House reports, authoritarian regimes are restricting human rights during the pandemic the most, democratic countries also have troubles with realizing the fundamental principles of democratic system. In 88 countries a partial retreat from democratic rules can be observed[12]. Obviously, the question to what degree will these negative changes affect democracy remains open, but it can be expected that liberal democracy will be weakened in many countries[13].

2. Populism is currently the main adversary of liberal democracy. Numerous studies give various definitions of it, but distrust of the ruling elites and the tendency to introduce a clear "us" versus "them" divisions come to the fore[14]. The second characteristic of populism may be the term "non-liberal" democracy", because out of the two pillars of liberal democracy I mentioned above, populism, at least declaratively, would like to leave just one, i.e., direct rule of the people[15]. This strategy is closely related to an anti-elitist attitude; populist movements seek to present themselves as the" vox populi", stigmatizing elites for being out of touch with social realities. In the vast literature on populism, it is widely debated whether such a general attitude can turn into a specific political agenda, all the more so, because the program spectrum of populism is extremely broad.

   The issue becomes pressing when groups which preach such slogans (voice of the people, anti-elitism) come to power either alone or as part of a governing coalition, as in the case of Poland and Hungary. Current experience shows that such system shows a tendency to strengthen executive power at the expense of other elements of democratic system, which may be a prelude to authoritarianism. Anti-elitist and anti-procedural attitudes of populism predispose it to take a

[10] Leszek Koczanowicz, Politics of Dialogue: Non-Consensual Democracy and Critical Community, Edinburgh University Press 2016 (Polish translation: Polityka: demokracja niekonsensualna i wspólnota krytyczna, PWN 2016).
[11] Mounk, Y. The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, Harvard University Press 2018; Zielonka J. Counter-revolution. Liberal Europe in Retreat, OUP 2017
[12] Democracy Under Lockdown, The Impact of COVID-19 on the Global Struggle for Freedom, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/COVID-19_Special_Report_Final_.pdf (access 12.12.2020).
[13] This is what 65% of experts surveyed in the study cited above expect. Poland is quoted as a country where: "Politicians make a statement unsupported by facts."
[14] Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, C. Populism. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press 2017
[15] Zakaria, F. The Future of Freedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, W.W Norton 2003

skeptical or even hostile stance on anti-COVID-19 measures. Cultural populism is coupled with anti-vaccination and, generally, anti-medical movements. However, political analyses indicate that political populism is rather cautious in this matter. A report by *Tony Blair Institute for Social Change* found that out of the 19 populist leaders analyzed, only 5 were skeptical about the pandemic[16]. This is probably due to the fear of losing support in the face of noticeable effects of healthcare crisis[17]. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that populist or quasi-populist countries (Hungary, Poland, the US during the Trump era, and the UK during Boris Johnson's rule) have regarded the pandemic as a useful token in the political game, highlighting the threat at times when it brings tangible political benefits. A key moment in the discussions on democracy will certainly be the introduction of vaccines and the convincing of people to get vaccinated. If this means the end of the pandemic, liberal democracy, with its attitude towards rational discussion, should be strengthened. However, when the whole operation fails and the pandemic will continue to be a threat, it will fuel populism. An additional problem is the anticipated economic crisis resulting from the pandemic. It is clear that it will fuel the popularity of populist movements unless it is relatively quickly reduced through an extensive state intervention.

3. Alternative models of democracy: deliberative, hegemonic, non-consensual. It is known that the problems of liberal democracy were already noticed in the late 1970s and 1980s and then, certain models of democracy appeared that were supposed to be improvements of the classic model. I am thinking here about deliberative democracy and hegemonic (radical) democracy. These two models come from different premises. In the case of deliberative democracy, they were the concepts by J. Habermas and J. Rawls who claimed that a rational consensus can always be achieved provided that certain political requirements are met. Improving democracy would mean that democratic debate cannot be reduced to just making choices from a specific pool of proposals put forward by the parties, but it must take so long that the various positions and arguments behind them can be presented. Then the choice will be truly conscious and rational. The **hegemonic democracy**, on the other hand, assumes that conflict is an inevitable feature of a democratic society and, as such, should not be avoided but rather "tamed" through turning opponents into adversaries, and antagonism into agonism. Then, the democratic vote gives hegemony to the winning side, but at the same time, the losing side can work on a rematch in the next election. The concept of **non-consensual democracy** emphasizes understanding which is supposed to be the middle way between the above-mentioned concepts. According to it, the aim of democratic dialogue is, first and foremost, to understand, not to agree. Deliberation, even if it does not lead to the consensus, paves the way to better mutual understanding among the sides of a conflict. I am discussing these three concepts together despite their significant differences, as they largely remain experiments of some kind, although they take on a new meaning in the face of popular belief that the classic model of liberal democracy needs to be changed.

   Actually, finding ways to improve the classic model is now a matter of survival of democratic society. A report by Bennet Institute for Foreign Policy, and the Cambridge University based on the surveys of nearly 5 million respondents from 160 countries between 1973 and 2019, shows a disturbing, but ambiguous trend. In general, every subsequent generation, starting with the first post-war generation, was increasingly disillusioned with democracy. The "millennials" are the most disillusioned with democracy of all generations. However, the report's authors observed an

[16] Brett Meyer, Pandemic Populism: An Analysis of Populist Leaders' Responses to Covid-19, https://institute.global/policy/pandemic-populism-analysis-populist-leaders-responses-covid-19 (access 12.12.2020)

[17] It can be assumed that Donald Trump's ambivalent attitude towards the pandemic contributed to his election defeat (cf. Christian Paz, All the President's Lies About Coronavirus, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/11/trumps-lies-about-coronavirus/608647/ (access 12.12.2020)

interesting phenomenon; in countries where populist leaders (both left and right) came to power, young people's support for democracy increased. Nevertheless, conclude the authors, it is uncertain what will happen if populists are in power for longer than one term. There are reasons to believe that then the support for democracy may diminish[18].

Everything that has been said above indicates that, to a large extent, the future of the democratic system will depend on how national authorities, but also transnational organizations (the European Union is an obvious example here) can cope with the pandemic. The question is not only whether they will be able to effectively eradicate the epidemic, but also what means they will use and, above all, to what extent they will be authoritarian decisions, and to what extent they will have wide public support. It is certain that the pandemic will accelerate the transformation of classic, liberal democracy. It must be enriched with elements of social solidarity at economic level and should possess greater co-decision possibilities. This should foster the deliberative or participatory democracy, although it can be assumed that new forms of communication and political decisions can be established using new social media. If it is defeated in the fight for public support and the fundamental decisions are made authoritatively, the populist movement, which contains elements of the hegemonic concept of democracy, but without its most important part, namely allowing all social voices into discourse, will gain the upper hand. Social media will then serve to build an information monopoly.

4. Final conclusions

a. The pandemic is a multi-aspect phenomenon of medical, social, cultural, ethical as well as political dimensions. Politically, it acts as a catalyst of certain trends that existed prior to its occurrence. It strengthens certain tendencies while reducing others. At present, during the pandemic, we can identify the areas where its impact is most significant, but, on the whole, we are not yet able to determine the direction of this impact. The situation will be clearer after new vaccines have been rolled out and the gradual extinction of the pandemic starts.

b. However, it is now clear that, as a consequence of the pandemic, political ideas that promote social solidarity will come to the fore, at least in the sphere of distribution. The pandemic has therefore enhanced an already existing in the public sphere, current of criticism of the free-market capitalism (neoliberalism) together with its political and legal superstructure. It is not clear, however, what political solutions will emerge as the consequences of this critique. For (re)distributive actions may be based on a broad public discourse, but they may also be arbitrary actions by governments strengthening their authority.

c. The pandemic is one of the many global crises, and similar threats may occur in the future. The settled, authoritarian response patterns to these issues, and the belief that they are the only way to resolve them will pose a serious threat to the survival of democratic societies.

d. The pandemic has clearly demonstrated that democracy must be radically reformed in order to survive such crises. The reforms should aim at increasing the scope of participation and deliberation, also through the use of social media. In the long run, transparent mechanisms need to be put in place for the relations between science (experts) and policy decision-making, which, combined with information policy, should reduce the effects of disinformation in the media, especially social media. Political education is absolutely crucial to ensure universal participation in decision-making as it guarantees better understanding of democratic procedures.

[18] Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Wenger, D., Rand, A., and M. Slade. 2020. "Youth and Satisfaction with Democracy: Reversing the Democratic Disconnect?" Cambridge, United Kingdom: Centre for the Future of Democracy, October 2020.



3. TOWARDS AN EUARENAS GLOSSARY – KEY CONCEPTS AND WORKING DEFINITIONS

Towards an EUARENAS Glossary – Key Concepts and Working Definitions

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1. Introduction

EUARENAS is not your typical academic research project. It transcends the boundaries of academic disciplines and professional specialization to develop a more comprehensive focus on social change and social learning. It is also intersectoral, bringing together practitioners, civil society activists and promoters of citizen participation and engaged universities. Consequently, the development and coherent deployment of concepts and terms are of paramount importance for the implementation of the EUARENAS project.

Taking the above as the starting point, the basic aim of the Working Paper at hand is to support the EUARENAS consortium to develop a language infrastructure – a common understanding of key terms and concepts – for the project. A common and coherent terminology within the project will support both theory-building and empirical research and will help to clearly express policy recommendations towards the end of the project.

In order to realise this ambition, a group of EUARENAS researchers representing SWPS, LUISS, UG, CRN, PVM and UEF came together in three online meetings in October 2021 to plan and organise the process of building a glossary of 'operational' terms for the project. As part of this, the team selected concepts and terms to be defined jointly and provided initial definitions. During the 3rd EUARENAS meeting in Helsinki, a workshop was organised to canvas the wider consortiums' perspectives on these definitions and revise them accordingly. Terms and concepts were discussed in groups and the resulting revised definitions of the terms were subsequently incorporated into this working paper.

It should be borne in mind that the Glossary published as part of this Working Paper Series will only be the start of the process of developing a common language and understanding of key terms and concepts in the project. Work on the definitions will continue over the course of the project, helping also to maintain an intellectual exchange between the Works Packages and provide inputs for later instalments of the Deliverables.

2. Concepts & Terms

Action Research

Action research can be defined as "an approach in which the action researcher and a client collaborate in the diagnosis of the problem and in the development of a solution based on the diagnosis. In other words, one of the main characteristic traits of action research relates to collaboration between researcher and member of organisation in order to solve organizational problems" (BRM 2021)

Actors

A person or organisation who 'acts' in a particular situation and affects (to greater or lesser degrees) its outcome - either directly or indirectly.

Case Study

A dynamic process entailing development of a particular METHOD in the local context (e.g., participatory budgeting in Gdańsk, citizens' assembly in Galway). We apply this term here in line with Flyvbjerg's (2006) recognition of CS as an efficient means of production of context-dependent knowledge. Application of the method in a specific way (ACTIONS) leads to specific responses/solutions (TOOLS). The tools produced allow to generate knowledge starting from the given context and therefore innovation. These tools may be, or not, applicable to other local contexts (TRANSFERABILITY). Each process is marked by TURNING POINTS which trigger changes in action necessitating elaboration of new tools.

Citizen

A person (who lives in a particular place) (Cambridge Dictionary 2021a)

Codebook

A document explaining the content of a data analysis and a guide for coding responses coherently. The cookbook should ensure consistency within a research project and be accessible from outside. The codebook should include the explanation of the methodology used, the description of the variables considered and the tools implemented to ensure the minimization of data gathering and analysis issues (i.e. intercoder reliability) (Lavrakas 2008).

Co-Governance

Co-Governance refers to the presence of a multi-stakeholder governance scheme whereby the community emerges as an actor and partners up with at least three different urban actors of the so-called Quintuple Helix model of Innovation for the collaborative management of urban commons: tangible or intangible socially constructed resources, assets, services, and infrastructure in cities that can be publicly or privately owned (Foster & Iaione 2016).

(Collective) Sense-making

This is a participatory approach to working with a group of people to ascertain different perspectives on data and topics in order to construct meaning. (Lévy 1997; Snowden & Boone 2007; Weick 1995)

Community of Practice

A collective and shared form of knowledge production during the research process and beyond that brings together academics, practitioners, policy-makers and citizens (people who have an interest in deliberative and participatory urban practices) in a joint learning process. The EUARENAS CoP seeks to examine and promote ways to strengthen participative and deliberative democracy in urban settings. (Wenger & Snyder 2000; Wenger et al. 2002)

Deliberative Negotiations

To combine deliberative theory with a classical theory of negotiations, the role of initial and transparent conflict of interests is stressed. If such negotiations remain non-coercive, they can be called 'deliberative'.

They can end with one of four effects: convergence (agreeing on a single outcome for the same set of reasons); incompletely theorized agreements (participants agreeing on a single outcome for different reasons); integrative negotiations (finding new solution dissolves the conflict of the interest); and fully cooperative distributive negotiations (the conflict of interests is maintained, but a distributive agreement that all consider fair is adopted). (Naurin & Reh 2018)

Deliberative Systems

In this approach, deliberative democracy is understood as a set of interrelated parts, such that a change in one tends to affect another. A 'division of labour' occurs between deliberative and non- deliberative institutions, practices, and actors. Precisely designed deliberation can have a positive, democratic impact on the system as a whole. Similarly, a range of nominally non-deliberative elements or actors can directly foster deliberation, therefore should not be left out of the scope of interest of deliberative democrats.

The systemic approach incorporates every-day talk, meta-deliberations on the political system, and an interplay of private interest and an expert bias into what is conceived as deliberation. This broad approach invites going beyond the strict procedure and structured deliberation, and to focus on the positive effects of open and reasonable debates on public issues. (Knops 2016; Mansbridge 1999; Mansbridge et al. 2010; Mansbridge et al. 2012)

Design Thinking provides a solution-based approach to understanding problems. It is a human-centred, open way of thinking and working as well as a collection of hands-on methods. (Brown 2021; Dam & Teo 2021)

Discourse/Discourse Analysis

Discourse is a specific linguistic construction for framing social, cultural and political understandings. They can help us to make sense of or understand our societies, as well as helping to shape our social, political and cultural spheres. Discourse analysis is a research method for analysing the use of language and its content,), and supports us to understand the way in which language is used and ultimately the meaning(s) within discourses within society. (Brown & Yule 1983; Carabine 2001; Hardy, Bhakoo, & Maguire 2020; Greckhamer & Cilesiz 2014; Hardy & Phillips 2004; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002; van Dijk 2016)

Driver Mapping

This is a process through which the key factors that will shape the future can be identified and discussed within their context. (UK Government Office for Science 2017)

Foresight

The umbrella concept of foresight represents a process that provides the scope for people to think about the future and use this to model and respond to potential prospective circumstances. Methodologies and approaches to undertaking foresight work are varied as future thinking activities can be conducted in a range of ways (i.e., horizon scanning, expert surveying, driver mapping, scenario-building, storytelling, road-mapping etc.). It is particularly relevant for contexts that are dealing with ‘uncertainty’ (Fox 2020) as it is intrinsically linked to learning and sense-making and thus all the more apt for the current climate and challenges that society is facing. It is important to see this future thinking work not as ‘prophecy’ or ‘prediction’, but as a systematic and action-driven way in which we can create and shape the future of our world. It is not about determining a singular, ‘correct’ version of the future, but instead about identifying plural visions for the future and how they can be achieved (OECD 2019; Inayatullah 2010; Makridakis 2004; Voros 2003; EU Commission 2021a; EU Commission 2021b; UK Government Office for Science 2017)

Horizon Scanning

This is a process through which signals of change in the present can be identified. Signals can be identified in a range of ways such as desk-based research and a number of approaches to 'surveying'. (Nesta n.d), OECD 2019; UK Government Office for Science 2017)

Informal and Formal Public Sphere

The public sphere is the discursive area where the political will and opinion of the people can be forming. It is a mediator between the state and society. To resist the process of colonization of the public sphere by capital and bureaucracy, Habermas (2001) proposes a deliberative model of politics that is based on a reconstruction of a robust, discursive public sphere. It should originate from a broad range of informal associations and everyday talks and in this way generate 'influence'. Subsequently, it should be supported by media and other channels to reach the formal public sphere, allocated near the core of modern political systems (i.e. parliaments). Arguments conceived this way form what is called a 'public reason'.

Knowledge Exchange

An interactive learning process that has both an internal and an external dimension. The internal dimension is aimed at facilitating the exchange between project partners within or beyond the project with regard to the topic at hand. This exchange supports the collation and analysis of findings and learnings for the benefit of the research project. The external dimension signifies the exchange of knowledge between the project and other interested parties that may find relevancy in a possible output of the project. Knowledge exchange has the purposes to support aspects such as empowering, learning and working toward a common goal.

Liberal democracy

A common name for a range of legal, institutional and structural designs that respect basic ideas of human rights, rule of law, separation of powers, market economy and democratic legitimacy. According to Mouffe (2000), it is an area of a constant tension between two exclusive notions - personal freedom and democratic equality. There is a broad range of 'liberal democratic' institutional solutions, e.g. parliamentarian or presidential regimes, majoritarian or proportional electoral systems, neoliberal or social-democratic economic approach etc. Liberal democracies rely on democratic representation, which is confirmed in regular elections, but is also supposed to be strengthened through public participation and lobbying. (Held 2009; Mouffe 2000; Rawls 2005)

Living Lab

"A living lab (LL), in contrast to a traditional laboratory, operates in a real-life context with a user-centric approach. The physical and/or organisational boundaries of a living lab are defined by purpose, scope, and context. The scope, aims, objectives, duration, actor involvement, degree of participation, and boundaries of a living laboratory are open for definition by its participants. A living laboratory could thus be established on a street, in a house, within an organization, or include a whole city or industry, depending on the project. LLs are both practice-driven organisations that facilitate and foster open, collaborative innovation, as well as real-life environments or arenas where both open innovation and user innovation processes can be studied and subject to experiments and where new solutions are developed. LLs operate as intermediaries among citizens, research organisations, companies, cities and regions for joint value co-creation, rapid prototyping or validation to scale up innovation and businesses" (FISSAC project website 2021)

Marginalisation

Marginalisation refers to situations that stop people from fully participating in social, economic and political life. It involves both processes and conditions that support and undermine social equity and justice. People who are marginalised tend to hold the least power in society and whose voices are often (easily) ignored by prevailing power structures. (The Research group for Marginalisation, Equity and Social Justice 2021)

Meta-consensus

Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) analysed the complexity of the notion of consensus and pointed to its three dimensions: normative (agreement of the values that should predominate the decision), epistemic (agreement on a belief about the impact of a policy), and preference (agreement on expressed preference for a policy). According to that view, even after achieving a consensus, its subjects need to determine if they share common reasons for that. This makes ideal types of deliberation even more difficult to achieve.

Instead, Niemeyer and Dryzek (2007) propose to turn the focus of deliberation to the meta-consensus in all three discussed dimensions. Meta-counterparts are easier to achieve when one or more dimensions of the consensus are disputed. This would be, respectively, a 1) recognition of the legitimacy of disputed values; 2) acceptance of credibility of disputed beliefs; and 3) agreement on the nature of disputed choices. Reaching a meta-consensus in one area can foster full agreement in others, bringing deliberation to a successful end.

Method

A mechanism of participatory or deliberative democracy implemented at the local level, with community empowerment tools capable of enabling participation. These are subject to certain rules of practice and procedure (e.g., participatory budgeting, citizens' assembly). In academic discourse the term tool is usually used in this context (Ufel 2021), but we would like to distinguish it from the TOOLS (see below).

Mini-publics

The concept proposed by Archon Fung to describe deliberative practices that take place in small groups of about 25 citizens. This number of participants allows for a direct, quality deliberation among all while (if structured properly) maintaining the minimum requirement allowing for scalability of the deliberative outcome. Bigger mini-publics, containing hundreds or thousands of participants, are usually divided into smaller subgroups. (Fung 2007; Mansbridge 1999; Smith & Setälä 2018)

Pilot

"A pilot study, pilot project, pilot test, or pilot experiment is a small-scale preliminary study conducted to evaluate feasibility, duration, cost, adverse events, and improve upon the study design prior to performance of a full-scale research project" (Wikipedia 2021; Thabane et al. 2010). "A pilot study, often referred to as a pilot project, is a mini-version of the project that allows the users to simultaneously test different methodological solutions and to select the most effective one for executing the project at full scale. Before diving head-on into a new, untested project idea, a pilot study can help PMs and stakeholders determine whether the project is likely to succeed. Additionally, pilot projects help manage risk and reveal serious deficiencies or flaws in the plan before substantial resources have been committed to the project." (McAbee 2021)

Protocol

A protocol is an agreed frame and description of intended research methods. In the applied urban research

field it is an empirical set of applied-phases that all the stakeholders involved in the process agree to follow in order to achieve a common scope. (Mbuagbaw et al. 2020; LabGov LUISS n.d.)

Prototype

Prototype – a minimal design of practice, tool, process or institutional/organizational arrangement. A first testing version of a product, service or process. An instance of singular, potentially transferable product. Is it delimited from the context/environment? (Cambridge Dictionary 2021b; Interaction Design Foundation 2021)

Scenarios

Visions for possible futures based on signals. They can be used to create shared understandings between groups of people. (Nesta n.d.; OECD 2019; Voros 2003; UK Government Office for Science 2017)

Signals

Indicators of potential futures/future trends found in contemporary source material. (OECD 2019; UK Government Office for Science 2017).

Stakeholders

A person or organisation who has a 'stake' in a particular situation.

Textual Analysis

This is a research method used for analysing visual, written and audio cues within texts and deciphering meaning and how it is constructed (i.e., media content). (Allen 2017; Burton 2007)

Toolbox

A set of tools derived from some actions analysed as case studies which, owing to their TRANSFERABILITY, have a potential of universal application outside of the local context. The toolbox contains a description of the tools and some suggestion for their use.

Tool

Tools are specific means that are used by urban practitioners and policy-makers for achieving the objectives of governance innovations studied within the case studies. The tools applied vary with and significantly impact the dynamic (turning points) of these processes. They can also be the results of prototypes or previous experiences. significantly impacting the dynamic of the processes.

Urban Experimentalism

Adoption of an experimental approach within the urban context, considering cities as areas of experimentation in which multiple actors can co-design innovative solutions to address needs and community issues (Evans & Karvonen 2014), is the key to making effective the relationship between the public system and urban policies. This perspective reflects the so-called "learning-by-monitoring" trend, which involves reviewing the customary rules as they are applied in the field (Sabel & Simon 2011) and the European Commission living labs.

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